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Introduction 
It is possible that Les-Îsles-de-la-Madeleine sit close to an oil and gas field much 
larger than Hibernia. Should you be very happy about this, cautiously optimistic, 
or bitterly opposed? By looking at experience elsewhere, I shall reach my own 
conclusion and at least give you information that you may find useful in forming 
your opinions. First, a quote about Alberta. 
 
The demands of the tar sands originate in the unstable, shifting politics 
and economics of world energy, in the investment strategies of the 
international petroleum industry, and in the policies of our own 
governments. Such demands have little in common with the needs of those 
most likely to be affected by development, and they have little to do with 
the best interests of Albertans and other Canadians in deriving the 
maximum benefit from the use of their exhaustible resources (Larry Pratt, 
The Tar Sands, 1976). 
 
Thirty-five years later, much the same could be written about the impact of oil 
sands development in Alberta. Will these words describe what will happen in Les-
Îsles-de-la-Madeleine? What will development mean for community 
sustainability? Is this a blessing that assures survival or a curse filled with false 
promises? The notion of oil as a curse comes from many cases in which local 
residents fail to capture a reasonable share of the value of the resource or 
experience a decline in their quality of their life. How do local and regional 
authorities relate to the oil and gas industry? Can they be effective in linking that 
development to community sustainability? These are my questions. 
 
Actually, I have often questioned the use of both community and 
sustainability, and the implicit values they convey. Community refers loosely to 
groups of people who have some common interest or values. When the common 
interest is place of residence, I have no problem with it. The further implication is 
that members of a community share common values and ways of behaving. I 
think this is highly misleading and romanticized when applied to localities.  
 
Sustainability is also problematic. It can mean that conditions of human 
life or of the physical environment are maintained with minimal change. 
However, it is rarely the case that all aspects of community (understood as place 
of residence) and environment can be sustained. They are often in contradiction, 
as when preservation of fish is at odds with maintaining a particular fishery. Also, 
it is usually assumed that sustainability is preferable to transformation, even to 
moderate change. I am always wary of romantic images of a past in which 
people of small communities worked together in consensus to maintain their lives 
in harmony with their environment. At least, let us ask what it is we want to 
sustain.  
 
So I understand community sustainability as people living in a particular 
location indefinitely. This does not mean that social institutions and cultures 
have to remain the same. Probably, such a static vision is impossible. If this is 
reasonable, I think the appropriate role for social science is to assess what might 
happen and in whose interests. What should happen is a question that I can 
answer only for myself.  
 
Energy sits at a critical intersection of people and the physical world. 
Together, they form a hybrid assemblage of materials, technologies, social 
organizations, cultural practices and humans. Energy in the form of fuel allows 
the complex system of global capitalism to function.  
 
Although complex systems are not fully predictable in principle, this does 
not mean that all outcomes are equally likely or that it’s useless to consider 
interventions that might generate more desirable outcomes. To do so requires 
understanding the dynamics at work, and especially the interests and powers of 
the various actors whose behaviour most influences the system. In my talk, this 
means the different levels of state or public authorities, corporate industrial 
networks, and local communities in so far as the latter are organized to act.  
 
In the remainder of this talk, I will highlight issues that should be kept 
front and centre during the process of development. I end with a short review of 
what has happened in Alberta and Canada’s western Arctic, but I focus mainly on 
the cold ocean context of Newfoundland to see what can be learned from that 
regional state’s struggle over development and from the experiences of fishers at 
a micro level.  
 
Regional authorities confront big oil 
Newfoundland and Labrador is an interesting example in considering the 
blessing or curse question. Before oil, this province had twice the national levels 
of unemployment, the highest per capita government debt, required yearly 
transfer payments from Ottawa to maintain public services, and experienced 
persistent out-migration. What took place informs us about the conditions under 
which local or regional authorities can succeed as they confront higher levels of 
government and major corporations.  
 
I will not review here the struggles between the provincial and federal 
governments over jurisdiction, nor the disputes with oil companies over 
technology and royalties for the first three fields. I shall only note that the royalty 
agreements produced little revenue for the province and that it proved difficult to 
ensure that the province would benefit from construction and engineering related 
to the development of the fields, largely because the wider circumstances of the 
industry did not make the resource at stake immediately attractive to the major 
companies. Without their expertise and willingness to invest, nothing can move 
forward. Instead, I will take you through the highly informative Hebron dispute. 
 
Discovered as long ago as 1981, Hebron has not yet been developed, 
probably because its heavy oil will be more expensive to extract than light crude 
and the refined product is worth less. Let’s look at what happened.  
 
During the early period, the lead operator for Hebron was Chevron (28 
percent) until ExxonMobil (37.9 percent) took over in 2008. The consortium also 
included PetroCanada (23.9 percent) and NorskHydro (10.2 percent). In 2000, 
Chevron announced interest in pushing ahead, but shelved that plan in 2002 
when lower oil prices appeared not to justify the cost (Baird 2002). By 2005, 
prices rose along with concern about a secure supply to make Hebron attractive 
again.  
 
In April, negotiations started with the provincial government, led by 
Danny Williams and the Conservative Party. Mr. Williams is more a 
Newfoundland nationalist and populist than a conventional conservative 
politician. This statement captures his style: 
 
The biggest thing that we had to change when we came into government 
was the psyche of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. We wanted to 
make sure that they felt very positive about themselves and had self-
confidence, that we're as good as the rest of Canadians… It's about earning 
respect and I think we're getting that (Gray 2008). 
 
In pursuit of this, Mr. Williams refused to be overawed by corporations or other 
governments.  
 
Agreement looked possible until Chevron announced that it was 
abandoning the project because the province would not agree on reasonable 
terms (Chevron 2006). What appeared to rankle the companies was the 
province’s insistence on an equity stake, although the final request was only 4.9 
percent. The second key demand was the introduction of a super royalty when oil 
prices were exceptionally high.  
 
 Williams’ response was that the real stumbling block was Chevron’s 
request for up to $500 million in tax concessions. Actually, he identified 
ExxonMobil as the difficult partner and offered to buy out its share to move 
forward (Jackson 2006). If not, he proposed legislation that would limit the 
amount of time a lease could be held without development. This required federal 
support, which was not forthcoming. Williams was furious: 
 
The fact that the prime minister is not supporting me on the whole fallow 
field exercise and legislation, the only explanation I can see is obviously 
he's a supporter of big oil… And if he wants to be a big buddy to big oil, 
that's for him to decide” (CBC 2006: par 9). 
 
In 2007, there was some public concern that the government had erred by 
pushing Chevron to the limit and causing a major slowdown in the area’s 
economy. On a number of occasions, the Newfoundland Ocean Industries 
Association claimed that they would suffer economic contraction with Hebron on 
the backburner and urged the Premier to resume negotiations. This annoyed Mr. 
Williams, who felt that such comments undermined the government’s position by 
making the “oil companies think they've got wind up their sails ... and the 
government are going to fold. Well, nothing could be further from the truth” 
(Baird 2006).  
 
Williams remained firm, oil prices rose, and in the summer, he announced 
an agreement in principle that included an investment by his government to 
secure 4.9 percent of the equity. What had been insurmountable obstacles, 
according to Chevron, melted away.  
 
The project was expected to produce about $16 billion for the province 
over a 25-year period.  A year later, the final agreement was greeted 
enthusiastically by business and the public in St. John’s where house prices 
reportedly jumped $30,000-50,000 the day the deal was proclaimed.   
 
In the Hebron dispute, no participant held total power and none got 
exactly the desired outcome. The Chevron group’s key resource was its 
willingness to develop Hebron. The government’s chief bargaining chip was that 
it had to approve the development plan for expansion into Hibernia South and 
this appears to have been delayed pending a favourable outcome on Hebron 
(Cattaneo 2007). Also, Mr. Williams’ general popularity as a defender of the 
people of the province remained high. Eventually, an agreement was reached that 
came reasonably close to the province’s objectives.  
 
The provincial government’s strategy of holding firm for its preferred 
conditions was effective, but only because circumstances beyond its control 
favoured this outcome. A knowledgeable interviewee stated that the companies 
decided to come back because they:  
 
…are always motivated by their ability to make a profit on a project and I 
think they believe that they can make a good profit from Hebron while still 
meeting the demands that the province has. So it’s basically, sort of, a 
regular business decision for them.  
 
Indeed, corporations do what their managers believe is necessary to make 
profit. They will eventually reach agreements when failure to do so would harm 
their interests. This appears to have been the situation with Hebron. Had the 
world been awash with potential oil fields in politically favourable locations, 
Hebron might have remained on the backburner for decades. Moreover, Canada 
is considered stable, friendly to capitalism and thus ideal for investment. The 
equity stake and increased royalties were moderate when compared with many 
developments around the world. Mr. Williams’ populist style might have irritated 
some company executives, but was surely irrelevant to the decisions to abandon 
and then to revive the Hebron project.  
 
The arrangement reached is generally advantageous for the province, 
although long-term benefits depend on an astute combination of reducing the 
huge per capita provincial debt and investment in long-term, environmentally 
friendly development. The short-term data carry a mixed message. For example, 
per capita disposable income shows a strong upward trend in recent years, but 
the province continued to lose population through migration until 2008-9, when 
the recession probably contributed more than anything else to a net gain 
(Newfoundland and Labrador Community Accounts). It still has the country’s 
highest per capita debt. 
 
The scale or unit of analysis is important because significant inequalities 
can exist among smaller segments of a region. Thus, the economic benefits of oil 
are much more visible in the capital city area than in the smaller communities 
around the coast, which continue to experience economic problems and 
population decline. Indeed, the St. John’s metropolitan area (Northeast Avalon 
zone) was the only part of the province to gain population from 2001 to 2006 – 
up 4.5 percent. More remote areas were especially hard hit. E.g., the Nordic zone 
on the tip of the Northern Peninsula, about 1,000 km from St. John’s, declined by 
12.2 percent. 
 
Unequal negotiation: Fishers and platform construction 
Of course, community sustainability should mean more than survival. In this 
section, I recount the experience of several small fishing communities in the early 
1990s that found oil development closer to a curse than a blessing. The 
agreement for development of the Hibernia oilfield called for construction of a 
gravity-based platform. This work had to be next to deep water to permit the 
platform to be towed to its site.  
 
Local inshore fishers whose long-term interests included protection of 
their fisheries and way of life used the chosen location, Bull Arm on Trinity Bay. 
Approximately 70 men fished from open boats about 7 to10 metres long to catch 
lobster, cod, flounder, crab and squid, while a few with slightly larger boats 
seined for herring, capelin and mackerel.  
 
How did they fare in their relationship with HMDC, the Hibernia 
Management Development Company led by Mobil Oil? HMDC eventually 
succeeded in having these fishers sign agreements that compensated them for not 
fishing in their traditional area. However, all was not well. After two years, a local 
mayor commented that, “If Hibernia left, I’d feel relieved… If it’s not there, you 
don’t expect nothing… There are so many people depressed and tormented about 
this that it’s sickening” (quoted in Ottenheimer, 1993:198-9).  
 
HMDC had the financial resources and skilled personnel to wield effective 
power over fishers of the area who hoped to preserve their way of life. They lost 
access to traditional grounds with limited compensation, but they did not voice 
opposition as HMDC shaped their sense of what they wanted. Fishers signed a 
contract but under conditions that distorted their understanding of their own 
interests. The forum for community level discussion that HMDC set up 
encouraged questions about opportunities for local employment and business, 
whereas matters concerning the fishery and environmental impacts were kept off 
the agenda.  
 
A consultant hired by HMDC to negotiate with fishers discouraged them 
from raising issues with the Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee. Few knew 
the committee existed. Women plant workers had no voice at all, and this was 
encouraged by the patriarchal domestic structure. Not even their fisher spouses 
considered speaking for them.  
 
HMDC controlled the setting of negotiations and fishers did not know 
about the early stages of planning. They believed the company’s promises of 
employment and prosperity. After signing, most thought they had a good deal 
with a guaranteed income, although they were told not to discuss the terms with 
anyone, and HMDC’s sole right to communicate about the contract was actually 
written into it. When conflict later emerged, this secrecy allowed others in the 
community to blame the fishers themselves. However, there was much pressure 
on the fishers: 
 
You know we’re not supposed to be talking to you about what’s going on… 
I don’t mind telling you about what’s going on, but I don’t want my name 
being used in any of this. Lord only knows what would happen if they 
found out (quoted in Ottenheimer 1993:155). 
 
Initially, most fishers trusted the company: “When we signed that deal we 
believed them and what they were saying… I really trusted them.” Yet, within a 
year, fishers learned that their guarantees were shaky because the final wording 
of their contracts was changed without them understanding that payments would 
end if construction was interrupted. When this did take place in 1992, after Gulf 
Oil withdrew from the project, fishers were shocked to discover that they had lost 
access to their fishing grounds along with the compensation. The secrecy strategy 
had worked in the interests of HMDC. One fisher put it clearly: “If we had our 
time back, we would have taken it (the contract) to a lawyer to look over… but we 
truly thought that Mobil was acting in good faith… now we know it was all a ‘put 
on’ to get us to sign.” They trusted so much that they had allowed others to define 
their interests and rights. By 1992, fishers were much more cynical: “They don’t 
care about the fishermen; they care about lining their pockets, that’s all” 
(Ottenheimer 1993:156-159). 
 
The message from this experience is that benefits can be illusions. People 
less skilled in law and organizational processes need trusted advisors to assist in 
achieving accommodation with oil development. Otherwise, small communities 
can become even more divided and their long-term sustainability is threatened. 
 
Alberta’s oil sands 
The environmental problems connected with the development of the oil sands 
have been publicized on a national and even a global scale. Socio-economic 
impacts are less visible and analysis of whose interests the oil sands serve is 
usually implicit. 
 
The companies that extract and process oil are the most obvious 
beneficiaries of this development. They have access to a resource that promises 
profit for decades if oil stays above $70 a barrel.  
• If the companies prosper, their owners and employees can expect 
economic benefits.  
• Individual shareholders and owners of mutual funds or pension plans that 
invest in these companies are beneficiaries. These networks of ownership 
extend well beyond Canada’s borders, probably to most parts of the world.  
• Similarly, owners and employees of companies that provide services or 
goods used in extraction, processing and distribution can expect economic 
gain.  
• Residents of Alberta may continue to pay less tax than other Canadians as 
they benefit indirectly from the revenues that accrue to the provincial 
government.  
• Consumers of energy from this source at least benefit from its availability 
even if the cost to them is high. 
 
With all these beneficiaries, one might assume that the only issues to be 
addressed are environmental. Yet, even the former premier and promoter of 
Alberta’s energy, Peter Lougheed, raised concerns about using increasingly scarce 
natural gas to extract the bitumen and about the lack of return to the provincial 
treasury from new projects until the costs of development have been covered. His 
conclusion: 
 
I keep trying to see who the beneficiaries are. Not the people in Red Deer, 
because everything they have got is costing more. It is not the people of the 
province, because they are not getting the royalty return that they should 
be getting, with $75 oil (Lougheed 2006:5). 
 
Lougheed thought the provincial economy was overheated, that poorer people 
and new migrants would suffer from high costs, and that young people would 
abandon their education for highly paid, relatively unskilled jobs connected to oil 
development. In a nutshell, these are the points that other critics, usually 
considered political or academic radicals, have raised. 
 
Some aboriginal people have experienced gains from oil sands 
development. For example, Suncor and the Fort McKay First Nation announced a 
joint business resources centre (Aboriginaltimes.com 2009). In 2007, more than 
1,500 aboriginal people worked in oil sands production, while others were 
employed in construction. Moreover, companies owned by aboriginal people held 
contracts worth $606 million (Alberta 2009).  
 
Despite such gains, by the summer of 2008, chiefs from three provinces 
and the North West Territories, meeting at Fort Chipewyan, united in a plea to 
halt further development until acceptable steps have been taken to assess the 
negative impacts and how to mitigate them (Henton 2008). As Chief Allan Adam 
put it: 
 
We have to slow down industry to let us catch up. … If we continue to let 
industry and government behave the way they’ve been behaving the last 
40 years there will be no turnback because it will be the total destruction 
of the land (quoted in Henton 2008). 
 
Their primary concerns were impacts on the water quality of the Athabasca River 
and the health of the people. The chiefs complained that development was 
moving ahead without their consent and that requests for baseline health studies 
were being ignored. They proposed alliances with other opponents, negotiation 
and legal action if necessary to protect their interests. Some months later two of 
these First Nations combined with Forest Ethics environmental group to place a 
full page advertisement in USA Today in which they argued against continued 
development of Canada’s “dirty oil” (CBC 2009).  
 
Apart from aboriginal people, many other residents of northern Alberta, 
even those who earn high incomes, have reservations about the social costs of 
rapid development. As indicated in “Boomtown hustles to keep up with 
breakneck growth,” written just before the downturn of 2008, the economic gains 
in Fort McMurray are tempered by high costs of housing and services.  
 
The Canadian North 
Nunavut alone is estimated to contain about 11 percent of Canada’s oil reserves 
and 20 percent of its natural gas, but the main area of interest is in the 
sedimentary basin of the MacKenzie delta and western Beaufort Sea (Voutier et 
al. 2008). All these resources are expensive to develop and lie in an inhospitable, 
fragile environment. Exploration promoted by the interventionist strategy of the 
federal government in the 1970s and early 1980s was responsible for discovery of 
most of these northern resources. However, with the end of exploration 
incentives and lower prices in the later 1980s, almost all drilling stopped until the 
early years of the present century. But I am too far ahead in the story. 
 
With the settlement of some important land claims and devolution of 
governance in various degrees to the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut, responsibility for development is now more complex, but the federal 
state still plays an important role. Thus, the federal Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development retains control over oil and gas management for the 
NWT and for all offshore areas.  
 
Aboriginal people are a majority of Canada’s northern inhabitants and 
their interests are critical to evaluating the impacts of various forms of resource 
extraction. Much of this story is about resistance until the conditions of 
development meet the perceived needs of northern residents. Thus, the 
organization and activities of aboriginal peoples, aided by environmentalists and 
sometimes by the state, limited the freedom of private capital to develop the 
industry for 40 years.  
 
Today, all northern development goes through stages of public 
consultation, environmental review and social assessment that are required by 
law. Federal and corporate powers remain central to what happens, but it is 
impossible simply to ignore aboriginal and territorial interests.  
 
In 2004, the Inuvialuit Game Council made the important point that 
approvals for individual projects may mask the environmental and social impacts 
of the total development process. Thus, the Council recommended that a strategic 
regional plan be produced for the Beaufort Sea, which the federal government set 
in motion with participation from communities, industry and various levels of 
government (Voutier et al. 2008:108-109). This proved to be a slow process.  
 
In April 2008, the report appeared, advocating various forms of 
collaboration among interested parties, incorporation of traditional knowledge 
into the planning processes, and careful monitoring of the environmental and 
socio-cultural impacts of development according to an agreed set of indicators. 
This report formed part of the input into an integrated management process for 
the Beaufort Sea as announced in 2009 (Beaufort Sea Partnership Newsletter 
2009).  
 
The goal for the Beaufort Sea integrated management planning process is 
to have an effective, collaborative process that provides integrated and 
adaptive management plans, strategies and actions for ecosystem, social, 
economic, and institutional sustainability. A collaborative process is an 
open, inclusive and transparent planning, advisory and decision-making 
process involving all interested and affected parties (Beaufort Sea 
Partnership 2009). 
 
This inclusive approach is inevitably slow, but it offers some hope that the 
interests of the people who live in the six communities that border the Sea will be 
considered, if not necessarily fully protected. Cases such as the fishers of Bull 
Arm show that power differences can still result in manipulation of sentiment 
leading to decisions that do not fit the interests of weaker participants.  
 
In 1974, opposition to a pipeline from the Mackenzie delta to northern 
Alberta led to the federal Berger Inquiry, which held hearings where radically 
different views were presented. Northern business people looked to economic 
opportunities, while whole communities of aboriginal people feared the end of 
their way of life. Reporting in 1977, the Inquiry’s core recommendations were 
that no pipeline be built for at least 10 years and not before the settlement of land 
claims. This reflected judge Berger’s view that any pipeline should benefit 
northern residents, including protection for the cultures of northern indigenous 
people. Moreover, in no circumstances were critically important habitat areas to 
be disturbed (Bankes and Wenig 2005). 
 
With sufficient protection for the environment and a land claims 
agreement in place, the economic stimulus and royalties from oil and gas 
development look attractive to many. Some people view such development as an 
opportunity to escape from dependency and economic colonialism. These include 
Floyd Roland, the NWT premier, who, in 2009, linked the pipeline with 
community sustainability: "We need to build an economy to build sustainable 
communities… You can have the rest of Canada helping us through transfer 
payments, or you can have the rest of Canada be partners with us in developing a 
stronger economy” (quoted in McCarthy 2009).  
 
Although some northern residents, especially those who hope for more 
business, favour development, opposition also exists and the necessary pipeline 
remains only a plan. The proposal involved Exxon, Shell, ConocoPhillips and the 
Aboriginal Pipeline Group (backed by TransCanada Pipelines) that represented 
the Inuvialuit, Sahtu and Gwichʼin peoples. The revival of interest in a new 
MacKenzie Valley proposal in 2004 resulted in extensive long-term consultations 
(CBC News 2007). The consultation process ended in December 2007 after years 
of work by a Joint Review Panel, but its report to the National Energy Board was 
delayed until December 2009 (Jones 2009). Although the Board did finally 
approve the project in December 2010, natural gas prices no longer make the 
huge investment sufficiently attractive for immediate action and Imperial Oil has 
requested three years to make up its corporate mind.  
 
Frustrated companies stopped drilling while the review process was 
underway. Some commentators believe that the partners will not invest the 
necessary $16.2 billion as long as the price of natural gas remains low and 
government does not step in with financial support, especially considering the 
revival of a plan for a competing Alaska pipeline, which might be operational in 
2018 (Jones 2009). For example, a Calgary company manager complained that, 
"For this thing to go, the government is going to have to step forward with great 
wads of cash - many billions of dollars" (McCarthy 2009).  
 
 Keeping the northern gas in the ground until the interests of northern 
community residents are clarified and protected makes social and environmental 
sense, but I think these communities will continue to change with or without a 
gas pipeline. If they are sustained, it is likely to be in the limited sense of 
continuous residence. 
 
Conclusion 
What are the policy implications for community sustainability? Is oil and gas 
development a curse or a blessing for community sustainability? 
Some thoughts from these cases: 
1. The answer often depends on the scale of the unit on which we focus. 
2. Individuals are not irrelevant to outcomes, but context is usually more 
important. 
3. It’s only a blessing if regional authorities hold back their signatures until 
they have secured sufficient income to provide long-term development 
support for communities – but 
a. This requires suitable external pressures on companies. 
b. A coherent investment plan for economic diversification and 
provision of services. 
4. Small groups with few financial resources and organizational skill need 
special protection that starts with, but should not be restricted to formal 
avenues for participation. Make sure that community members really 
understand what is happening. 
5. Keep the pace slow and limit accumulation of problems 
 
Remember that corporate managers are under stress to demonstrate success as 
profit makers in the first instance. Trust is rewarded only in the easy times. 
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